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by Richard W. Wahl*
Abstract
Administrative means, rather than market forces, were used to
allocate much of the water developed by large-scale state or
federally sponsored water projects in the western states. Over
the past decade no state has enacted as much legislation
specifically directed at facilitating voluntary market transfers of
water as has California. yet, the state has witnessed very few
such transactions. The transfer of over 100.000 dcre feet of con-
served water between the Imperial Irrigation District and the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, and the
acquisition in 1991 by the state-operated drought water bank of
over 800.000 acre feet of water In the midst of a drought is
ample evidence that market forces can work to the benefit of
water users. However, there have been very few long-term trans-
fers within the Central Valley of California or involving the fed-
eral Central Valley Project. The drought banking operation did
not really operate on market principles, but rather was a state-
administered program that established uniform prices for all
participating purchasers and sellers, and adopted certain undu-
ly restrictive rules for participation.
The California Department of Water Resources has
approached transfers cautiously, and the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation in California has failed to broadly implement poli-
cies of the Department of the Interior to facilitate transfers.
Most agricultural water districts have viewed the potential for
water transfers only very tentatively (out of concern over the
security of their water rights and potentially adverse affects on
the districts and the local communities). Environmental inter-
ests have relied principally on legal challenges to water rights
and legislative mandates, rather than water purchases, to fur-
ther their goals.
Even though the state did not experience drought condi-
tions for 1993. water agencies are likely going to experience
reductions in water availability because of environmental
restrictions imposed by federal legislation and endangered
species requirements (if not also by the State Water Resources
Control Board)--%,hat some have termed a new -regulatory
drought.- As a result. California water agencies should consider
continuing the water bank in a form that incorporates more
market principles and/or allowing privately negotiated transac-
tions to serve the same function,
Recent federal legislation established a fund by which
state and federal government bodies can make market purchas-
es of water for fish and wildlife purposes. As a consequence,
environmental interests will also have a stake in the certainty of
the rights they plan to acquire. In this regard, the state might
also benefit by adding full appropriative rights for instream and
fish and wildlife purposes to its water code, as other states have
done.
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1. Introduction Reclamation in California has failed to broadly imple-
ment Department of the Interior policies to facilitate
When it comes to treating water as a marketable corn- transfers. Most agricultural water districts have con-
modity, California exhibits several contradictions. sidered the potential for water transfers only very ten-
Over the past decade no Western state has enacted as tatively, out of concern over the security of their water
much legislation specifically directed at facilitating rights and potentially adverse affects on the districts
voluntary market transfers of water. However, by the and local communities. While the drought water bank
judgment of most experts, very few such transactions and other recent transfers are taken by many to Indl-
have occurred in California, particularly in comparison cate that these attitudes are changing, other aspects of
to the volume of water used and transported in the
state. As Table I shows, a 1991
study covering six Western states
found only three severance and Table I
transfer applications in California Water Right Char
from 1975 through 1984, corn- Filed in Six West(
pared to much larger numbers in
the other states examined.' On Applica
the other hand, the state is also
the locus of two major, isolated Arizona 30
examples of successful water California 3
a
Colorado 858
transfer activity. The 35-year New Mexico 1,133
agreement to transfer about Utah 3,853
100,000 acre feet of conserved Wyoming 40
Colorado River water betveen the Adapted from I THE w,
Imperial Irrigation District and the Table 3.2.4 and 2 THE V
Metropolitan Water District of Table 2. aNo applicatio
until 1982. tCaliforniaSouthern California (the largest cases filed between 19;
single transfer of water in the
West) and the acquisition in 1991
by the state-operated drought water bank of over
800,000 acre feet of water in the midst of a drought,
most of it within about 30 days time, are ample evi-
dence that market forces can work to the benefit of
water users in the state. Still, for all the successful
agreements entered into by the Metropolitan Water
District in the southern part of the state, there have
been very few long-term transfers within the Central
Valley of California or involving the federal Central
Valley Project. And there are criticisms that the
drought banking operation did not really operate on
"free market" principles, but rather was a state-admin-
istered program that established uniform prices for all
participating purchasers and sellers, and adopted cer-
tain unduly restrictive rules for participation.
More generally, market transfers of water in the
state are not a routine phenomenon. The underlying
causes of the dearth of transfers probably have more
to do with attitudes toward water transfers than with
the legal basis for transfers in the state. While scholars
and some environmental groups have strongly
endorsed market transfers of water, other groups have
not. The Department of Water Resources has
approached them cautiously, and the Bureau of
water management in the state indicate that wider
adoption of market transfers will
face certain other hurdles origi-
nating from long-standing con-
flicts over the management of
water in California.
These conflicts are similar, to
some extent, to conflicts In other
states as well-conflicts over
urban versus rural uses of water
and between environmental uses
and other uses. in California, such
conflicts have been particularly
sharp regarding the water flows
through the Sacramento/San
Joaquin Delta and from the area
north of the Delta to the southern
part of the state. Historically,
waters in the Delta joining these
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ns were filed in California
data on approvals reflect
82 and 1989.
unchecked to the San Francisco Bay and the ocean,
However, both the federal Central Valley Project and
the State Water Project have developed storage facili-
ties for the more ample supplies in the northern part
of the state principally for transport to those parts of
the state south of the Delta. Transport through the
Delta has involved the construction of large pumping
plants on the south side of the Delta, which lift the
water into canals for transport farther south. Among
the adverse environmental impacts of this pumping
are the migration of salt water further Inland in the
Delta and the entrainment of fish and other biota In
the pumping plant. Upstream water withdrawals by
project users, as well as diversions by other projects
and water rights holders have also reduced flows in the
Delta and entrain fish at unscreened pumps. The quan-
tities and timing of the altered flows in the Delta have
impacted the migration of fish upstream In the
Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers. Water diversions
and the conversion of land near streams and rivers to
agricultural use has also substantially reduced the
acreage of wetlands in the Central Valley. As discussed
later in this paper, to date the participants in the con-
flicts surrounding these environmental issues have
!. I THE WATER TRANSFER PROCESS AS A MANAGEMENT OP1TON FOR
MEETNG CHANGING WATER DL\AoDs 47 (Lawrence I. MacDonnell ed.. 1990)
1 hereinafter THE WATER TRANSFER PRocEssi. Some of this difference can be
accounted for by the fact that the water permits granted to the state and
federal prolects in California are quite extensive geographically and.
therefore, transfers within these projects can take place without appli-
cation to the state. Brian E. Gray, Water Transfers In California 1981-1989,
in THE WATER TRANSFER PROCESS, supra, at 2 Also, transfers of pre-1914
rights in California do not require state approval and are not Included In
Table I.
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focused on resolution through legal and legislative
avenues, an approach which has created additional
uncertainty over water entitlements and market trans-
fers of water.
II. Water Transfers In the Evolution
of Western Water Lav
Market transfers of water can take various forms. They
can be short-term (seasonal) leases of water, long-
term leases (for example. 30 years). or permanent
sales. They may involve transfer of all or some fraction
of an underlying water right, or they may be transfers
of all or some fraction of the contractual deliveries of
water obtained from a wholesale water supplier, such
as the California State Water Project (SWP) operated
by the Department of Water Resources or the federal
Central Valley Project (CVP) operated by the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation. Transfers may be initiated by
owners of private water rights, by water districts, or by
individual landowners receiving water within a district.
In the latter case, some form of review or approval
from the water district is normally required.
Voluntary market transfers benefit buyers and
sellers. Buyers can obtain water supplies more inex-
pensively than from new project construction. Sellers
are compensated at a rate greater than the profit they
would have realized from retaining the water. Because
water is moved to where it has greater economic value.
productivity in the region encompassing the buyer and
the seller is increased. Transfers also have the benefit
of increasing the efficiency of use of water, particularly
for federally subsidized projects where the low charges
to contractors may be far less than the value of the
water.2 For transfers to be efficient, those transferring
water must not be allowed to injure the water rights of
other water rights holders, unless those injured parties
agree to accept compensation, and all Western states
have provided such protection in their water codes.
Similarly, there needs to be some vehicle for protect-
ing water uses that do not normally participate in mar-
ket transactions, but that provide economic benefits.
such as fish and wildlife and instream uses.3
In fundamental ways. market transfers of water are
a revolutionary concept. The allocation of surface
water in the Western states evolved under the legal
doctrine of -prior appropriation." Under this doctrine.
the first to divert water from a stream and put it to ben-
eficial use. such as for agriculture, industry, or domes-
tic supplies, acquired the right to the quantity of water
diverted. Subsequent appropriators on the same
stream had more junior rights, which are the first to be
subject to curtailment during times of low flow.
Appropriative rights must be used continuously to
remain valid, If a water user fails to exercise his or her
right for a number of years. the right may be chal-
lenged in state forfeiture proceedings (carried out in
California by the State Water Resources Control
Board). The exact standards of use regarded as -bene-
ficial" are often not well defined by states. Forfeiture
actions or actions to prohibit waste or unreasonable
use are normally undertaken only when a particular
challenge is filed, and such actions normally involve
time-consuming and costly proceedings. As a conse-
quence. in Its original form. the beneficial use doctrine
has not served the West very well as competition for
water has increased. Its success would depend upon
the continual development of new water use standards
by states and the enforcement of such standards on all
water rights. Given the large number of individual
water rights and the variety of water uses, this would
be a vastly expensive undertaking.
However. concepts in the appropriative water doc-
trine have been evolving toward an alternative means
to increase efficiency of use. namely, allowing the
lease or sale of water rights and conserved water. This
approach, which is codified in detail in California water
law (see the next section). provides a financial incen-
tive to current water rights holders to limit their use.
The concept was regarded as revolutionary by some
because it allowed senior, high priority rights to be
sold to very junior, or even new. appropriators. Under
this system the existing intermediate appropriators.
could argue that water unused by senior appropriators
should belong to them. However. such an interpreta-
tion provided no Incentives, other than enforcement
actions, to senior appropriators to conserve water. In
fact. the Incentives were just the opposite, an appro-
priator had to use all of his or her senior rights, no
matter how meager the economic returns might be, or
face losing some fraction of them.
The tension between these two administrative
approaches in Western water law (enforcement of
tighter beneficial use standards vs. providing incen-
tives for conservation through voluntary water trans-
fers) is by no means completely resolved. The transfer
agreement between Imperial and Metropolitan. under
which Imperial will receive over S100 million from
Metropolitan for conservation investments, was moti-
vated in large part by a California State Water Board
enforcement action in which Imperial was accused of
wasting water.4 Metropolitan argued that Imperial,
under its contract with the Department of the Interior
2. For additional discussion of the value of market transfers, see
LM_ HAmr wN & DON SEAsToNE. WATER TRANSFERS EcoxoIc EmENCy AND
ALTERNATvE INs1TnruoNs (1970). TERRY L ANDERSON. WATER CRw F-;I nI;
THE Poucy DROUGHr (1983). BONNIE C SAJIBA & DAVID B BUSH. WATER
MARKETS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE MARKET RANSFERS. WATER VALUES. AND
PuBuc PoucY (1987). and RiCHARD W WAHL. MAIRETs FOR FEDERA. WATER
SUBSIDIES. PROPERTY RiGHcs. AND THE BUREAU OF RECtA.A'AnON (1989)
3 For a discussion of extending water rights to corer such uses.
see A;sI. supra note 2. and Richard w Wahl. AcqtiCn ci aL'r for
lnnm Ft"si. Rr.'=s I IM)
4 CARUrCZ ',ik DET OF WATER RESOURCES. I5TI , aTION UNDER
C&L2.tWATEstcozE Szcrou 275 c7 Us~ or WATER ev NhOERIAI. bmRa.TIon
DsTECT 11981), Rcz= SrAxcc. z EC.LzA Da7sF' u'no. Tx~zzz
CC-fXRVATION INET2NSFoE W1ATER: 119331, B.,sG OCtsir ET AL.
NIM' 't TRCMAIs of W'oerf in (Crfi)[1[Spring 1994
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for Colorado River water, had no right to sell water and
that Metropolitan should receive any water Imperial
was forced to conserve as a matter of course in the pri-
ority chain. 5 On the other hand, Imperial took the posi-
tion that it had the right to sell conserved water under
provisions of California law. One form in which this
issue was framed was whether California law or feder-
al law applied (in which these matters have not been
well defined). The Department of the Interior post-
poned issuing a ruling on Imperial's right to sell water
and encouraged the tvo parties to negotiate a settle-
ment. Ultimately, practical considerations prevailed,
and the two parties reached an agreement to transfer
water without settling the legal question regarding
Imperial's right to sell water, an issue which could
have required years of litigation to resolve.6
ill. California's Legislative Initiative to Facilitate
Voluntary Water Transfers
A. Initiatives Before the Drought
One condition for efficient market transactions is
security of tenure over and clarity of rights-otherwise,
there is considerable uncertainty over what is being
sold. Since the early 1980's, the California legislature
has taken several steps to transform the concept of
prior appropriation and to define water as a mar-
ketable commodity.7
In 1980, the legislature declared that "efficient use
of water requires certainty in the definition of property
rights to the use of water" and that it is "the estab-
lished policy of the state to facilitate the voluntary
transfer of water and water rights where consistent
with the public welfare of the place of export and the
place of import."8
A fear that has plagued parties who might be
TRANSFERRING WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES-A COMPARISON OF
POLICIES AND PROCEDJRES (Natural Resources L. Center. U. of Colo.,
Occasional Paper Series, 1989). Richard W. Wahl & Robert K. Davis.
Salisfyfng Southern California's Thirst for W'ater- Efficient Alternatiies, in SCARCE
WATER AND INSTMMONAL CHANGE (Kenneth D. Frederick ed.. 1986).
5, In the system of priorities established by the 1931 "Seven Party
Agreement" among California users of Colorado River water, the
Coachella Valley County Water District and the Palo Verde Irrigation
District both have rights with priorities between those of imperial and
those of Metropolitan. For additional detail, see STAVINS, supra note 4.
and Wahl & Davis. supra note 4, at I10. In fact, objections raised by
Coachella lengthened the negotiations over Metropolitan's transfer of
water from Imperial.
6. One fact which would bolster Imperial's position in this dispute
Is that a large portion of Imperial's entitlement consists of"present per-
fected rights" under the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v.
California, 373 US. 546 (1963). Such rights might arguably enjoy the
transfer provisions of California law. rather than being subject to a
potentially differing federal Interpretation The state asserted jurisdic-
tion over the use of water by Imperial when it became involved in an
enforcement action alleging waste and unreasonable use by Imperial
However, the form in which the issue was settled does not provide a
clear answer as to whether the state considered all of the water transfer
provisions of state law as applicable. More specifically, both Imperial
and Metropolitan had water permits from the State of California. in addi-
tion to contract rights from the federal government. Both entities will
interested in transferring water is that the transfer
itself would be used as evidence to cut back on their
water rights. In other words, if a farmer transferred
some fraction of his or her water, the farmer's ability to
transfer water might be seen as evidence that not all of
the water specified in the original water right was nec-
essary to sustain the existing beneficial use. The
California legislature addressed this concern by
declaring that the leasing or sale of water would not be
used as evidence of waste and would not affect any
determination of forfeiture: "Itlhe sale, lease,
exchange, or transfer of water or water rights, in Itself,
shall not constitute evidence of waste or unreasonable
use...."9
Water law prior to 1980 established reclamation
and conservation of water as beneficial uses of water
and protected such water against forfeiture)10 The
statutory definition of conservation is broader than the
conventional use of that term and includes water "not
used by reason of land fallowing or crop rotation. ""
Legislation enacted in 1982 authorized the sale, lease,
or exchange of such reclaimed or conserved water. 12
The authority to lease or sell is not restricted to con-
served or reclaimed water;13 water agencies are autho-
rized "to sell, lease, or otherwise transfer water that Is
surplus to the needs of the agency's water users for
use outside the agency." 14 Surplus is defined very
broadly to include not only water "which the agency
finds will be in excess of the needs of the water users
in the agency for the duration of the transfer,""5 but
also water for which a "water user and the agency
agree, upon mutually satisfactory terms, that the water
user will forego use for the period of time specified In
the agreement...."16 This latter section also asserts the
authority and the broker role of the water district by
providing that "the agency shall act as agent for the
water user to effect the transfer. " 7 Originally, transfers
continue to operate within these permits after the proposed transfer
(both will be using quantities of water within the allowable quantities
and places of use In theiroriginal permits). Therefore, neither entity filed
for a change in place of use with the State Water Resources Control
Board to effectuate the transfer and none was granted See also. Gray.
supra note I, at 38-40.
7. For more detailed discussion of the provisions of the California
Water Code dealing with water transfers, see Gray, supra note 1, and
Brian E. Gray et al., Transfers of Federal Reclamation Water- A Case Study of
California's San Joaquin Valley, 21 ENVrL L. 911-983 (19913
8. CAL WATER CODE § 109(a) (West Supp 1992) Citations to the
California Water Code, infra, are generally taken from West Supplement,
1992. The more recent amendments addressing operation of the state
water bank were obtained from the offices of the state legislature
9. CAL WATER CODE § 1244 (West Supp. 1992)
10. Id. §§ 1010(a). 1011(a).
11. Id. § 1011(a).
12. id. §§ 1010(b). IolI(bj.
13. Id. § 382.
14. Id. § 382.
15 d. § 383(a w
16. Id. § 383(c)
1I. Id. The authority of water users within a district to transfer
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were limited to a period of seven years. but this restric-
tion was removed in 1986.18 California Water Code sec-
tion 383 now provides that transfers may be for a
longer period if mutually agreed upon by the transfer-
ring parties.' 9
Except for the limitation of transfers to seven
years, one might presume that the detailed amend-
ments to the California Water Code through 1982 pro-
vided adequate guarantees to transferring parties and
would lead to a number of such transactions, without
any need for additional changes to the water code. But
that has not been the case. Legislation was enacted In
1984 which specifically addressed the conservation of
water by the Imperial Irrigation District, assuring that
.no forfeiture, diminution, or impairment of the right
to use the water conserved shall occur. "20 The legisla-
ture also amended sections of the water code to
encourage state agencies and water districts to Incor-
porate water transfers into their planning. For exam-
ple, in 1984. urban water management plans were
required to incorporate consideration of water trans-
fers.2' Legislation enacted in 1985 made explicit that
water districts had authority to contract for water con-
servation and to sell the conserved water.22 The Costa-
lsenberg Water Transfer Act of 1986 contained another
statement of water transfer policy.23 as well as direc-
tives to state agencies, which, among other things.
require the maintenance of a list of water agencies
desiring to transfer water 24 and the production of a
water transfer guide. 2' Other legislation in 1986
addressed another potential obstacle to water trans-
fers by its 'common carrier' provisions, which required
that existing water agencies with surplus capacity in
their conveyance facilities make up to as much as 70
percent of that surplus capacity available to current
users of the facilities for transferring water.2 6
In 1988. existing statutes regarding temporary
transfers (defined in statute to be transfers of one year
or less) were consolidated.27 They protect the right of
the transferee by guaranteeing that the rights to trans-
fer water will revert to the original owner after the peri-
od of the temporary transfer without any action by the
State Water Resources Control Board.23 California
Water Code section 172029 exempts short-term trans-
fers from the California Environmental Quality Act
under which an environmental impact report might
need to be prepared. The exemption is justified
because the time required to prepare such documen-
tation could have rendered it impossible to easily
Implement transfers that might be only a few months
In duration. Hdwever. California Water Code section
1717"0 requires that short-term transfers not injure
other water rights and 'must not unreasonably affect
fish, wildlife, or other Instream uses.'"30 In 1991. provi-
sions requiring notice to the Department of Fish and
Game and opportunity for review were added to sever-
al sections of the water code, including those sections
referring to short-term and long-term transfers,3' and
petitions for a change in use.32
B. Drought Water Bank Legislation
The drought water bank in California (described in
more detail below) was established in February 1991,
pursuant to an executive order of the Governor and
recommendations by a state Drought Action Team.
Participation in the bank would appear to have been
protected by prior legislation regarding transfer of con-
served water, temporary transfers, and the contracting
authority of districts. However, three bills were enact-
ed during the 1991-92 extraordinary session of the
state legislature and signed into law on April 17. 1991.
that specifically encouraged and protected participa-
tion in the bank. Assembly Bill 9 (Chapter 1) allowed a
supplier of water to contract with a state water bank or
other water user outside its service area if the govern-
Ing body of the supply determined it to be in its best
interest and If the water users consented. 3 3 Assembly
Bill 9. section 2. explicitly recognized several sources
of water as appropriate for transfer: conserved water,
traditional sources of water made available by growing
water and the authority of the district to control such 'user Initlated"
transfers has been a principal focus of recent bills In the California leg-
islature. See also the discussion of the federal Central Valley Prolect
Improvement Act. below.
18. See C&. WATER CODE § 387 (West Supp. 1990): set also Cray. sura
note i. at 44 n.33.
19. CAL WATER CODE § 383 (West Supp. 1992).
20. Id. § 10 11. This section. which addresses conservation and pro-
tects conserved water from forfeiture, would appear to have provided
Imperial with adequate protection for the agreements It was negotiating
with Metropolitan. Presumably Imperial sought the additional assur-
ance provided in this law because it was already under a State Water
Resources Control Board proceeding and because § 1244 of the code.
see supra note 9 and accompanying text. provided a weaker protection
(that the sale, lease, exchange, or transfer of water or water rights. In
itself, did not constitute evidence of waste or unreasonable use). See
Gray. supra note I. at 38.
21. CAL WATER CODE § 10632(b) (West Supp. 1992).
22. Id. § 11960.
23. Id. § 475.
24 Id §481
25 id § 482
26 Id, 1810-14.
27 Id .4 1725-.32
2& Id § 1731
29 U.§ 1720
30 I § 1717
31 Ud 0 1726. 1736
32 Id- § 1704
33 This legislation may have pro-ided some protection against
charges that the water could not be surplus to the needs of an agency
during a drought (compare § 382 of the California WaterCode)_ Section
3 of Assembly Bill 9 provides that water may be transferred 'whether or
not the water. Is surplus to the needs of the service area of the water
supplier - How'ever. § 3831b) of the existing WaterCede appears to have
provided similar protection because It defined -surplus" to Include any
water that members of the agency dedded to forgo using for the dura-
tion of a transfer
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crops with water from substitute sources, and water
made available through land fallowing (not growing
crops on the land). Senate Bill 9 (Chapter 2) declared
that any temporary transfers made for drought relief
would not affect water rights. Assembly Bill 10
(Chapter 3) also addressed the contracting authority of
water districts for the purpose of conserving water dur-
ing the drought. The authority of all three bills extend-
ed only until January 1, 1993. However, Assembly Bill
2897 (signed into law on August 12, 1992) generally
extends the authorities in these three bills beyond
1992. Assembly Bill 2897 authorizes contracts with
water banks or other water suppliers or water users
inside or outside the service area of the water suppli-
er,34 allows transfer of water whether or not the water
is surplus to the needs of the water supplier,3 5 and
specifically includes land fallowing within its defini-
tion of conservation.3 6 If land fallowing agreements
involve the sale of more than 20 percent of the water
supply of a district, then public hearings and district
concurrence are required.37 The authorities in the bill
are not limited to drought periods.
Whether or not one regards all of the various
amendments to the California water code as duplica-
tive or as necessary extensions of the existing water
code provisions, this litany of amendments reflects an
extreme degree of caution toward water transfers by
irrigation districts, which are the major water rights
holders in California. Some of the other reasons why
this caution exists are discussed below. First, however,
the operation of the state water bank is explored, as
well as federal water legislation and water transfer pol-
icy.
IV. Operation of the State Water Bank
By 1991, California had already suffered four years of
drought and winter precipitation had again been mea-
ger.38 In February 1991, the state Department of Water
Resources announced that the State Water Project
would make no deliveries for the coming year to its
agricultural contractors, only 10 percent of normal
deliveries to its municipal and industrial contractors,
and only 50 percent of normal deliveries to those con-
tractors with prior "settlement" rights on the Feather
River.39 During the same period, the federal Central
Valley Project announced that its contractors would
34. CAL WATER CODE § 1745.06 (West Supp. 19921.
35. Id. § 1745.05(b).
36, Id.
37. Id.
38. The following statistics about the drought are taken from
CAuFoRNLA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES. THE 1991 DROUrHT WATER BANK
(1992).
39 Settlement contracts resulted from legal settlements between
the state agendes authorized to construct water storage facilities and
those districts or individuals with prior water rights. Those holding prior
receive only 25 percent of their contract amounts and
that its water rights settlement contractors would
receive 75 percent.
As a result of this drought situation, Governor
Wilson signed an executive order on February 1, 1991,
calling for certain steps to be taken immediately4 0
Among other actions, the order directed the
Department of Water Resources to "develop a clear-
inghouse for facilitating water marketing transactions
betveen willing sellers and buyers of water, consistent
with the need t6 protect fish and wildlife resources."41
The order also established a Drought Action Team
consisting of the directors of several state agencies,
chaired by David Kennedy, the Director of the
Department of Water Resources. Among the responsi-
bilities of the team were to "recommend any addition-
al measures which it deemed necessary to combat the
drought and protect the health, safety, and property of
the people, while providing maximum feasible protec-
tion to the important environmental resources of the
state."42 The first report of the team was to be submit-
ted by February 15, and this report contained, among
other recommendations, one to create an emergency
drought water bank to supply four critical needs:
municipal and industrial uses, agricultural uses, the
protection of fish and wildlife, and carryover storage
for 1992.43 As noted above, the authority of water dis-
tricts to participate in the bank and the protection of
those transferring water to the bank were bolstered by
legislation signed into law on April 17, 1991.
The Department of Water Resources was assigned
responsibility for operating the water bank.
Membership in the bank (as a purchaser) was limited
to those who signed contracts to purchase water, and
standardized purchaser and seller contracts set out the
basic rules for the bank's operation.4 4 An important
component of the bank is the Water Purchase
Committee, on which each member is entitled to one
representative. Recommendations of the committee
are subject to approval by the bank members,
According to the voting rules set out in the purchaser
contracts, each member has one vote and actions
must be approved not only by a majority of the mem-
bers, but also by members whose financial commit-
ments to the bank total more than 50 percent of the
dollars committed to both purchase contracts and
option contracts (described below). However, In both
1991 and 1992, the bank normally operated by the con-
rights agreed to forgoe their rights in exchange for contracts for prolect
water, provided they obtained higher priority than other prolect con-
tractors. Similar contracts were developed in the federal CVP
40, Governor of California. Exec Order No W-3.91 (1991)
41. Id. at 3.
42. Id. at 2.
43. CALiFoRNiA DEPT OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 38, at I
44. Most of the provisions discussed here are from the 1992 pur-
chaser and seller contracts, The 1991 contracts were similar In most, but
not all, respects.
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sensus of its members, rather than by formal vote.
According to the rules of the bank. each member sub-
mits its critical water needs to the bank, which in 1992
had to be accompanied by either an option request or
a purchase request.45 The standard price of an option
deposit established in the 1992 contract was $20 per
acre foot ($10 for the water. $5 for "carriage water loss-
es" for transporting water through the Sacramento/San
loaquin Delta. and $5 for administrative costs).
Option deposits are forfeited if the water is not taken
or cannot be taken by another member. The standard
price for a purchase deposit was set in the 1992 con-
tract at $90 per acre foot ($60 for the water. $25 for
Delta carriage water losses, and $5 for administrative
costs). These prices are subject to modification by the
water purchase committee from time to time during
the year. and the actual prices charged by the bank dif-
fer from these amounts, as discussed below. Options
specify the month for delivery, and allocations of the
available bank water are made about the 10th of each
month to those members with purchase requests and
exercised options. Allocations are made each month
without reference to the date on which requests were
submitted.4 According to the bank's rules, charges are
set at the average cost, or "melded rate." of the %-ater
available in the pool for sale that month. However, in
its operations the bank basically kept uniform pur-
chase prices throughout the season.47
Those purchasers with unmet needs from one
month are automatically included in the pool of pur-
chase requests for the next month. If the bank cannot
deliver all of the water requested, it is obligated to
refund the money forwarded to it. less half of the
administrative costs. If the bank has excess water,
members have the first right to purchase it. All pur-
chases are made "at the Delta." and purchasers must
pay (through separate delivery contracts) the addition-
al costs for pumping water from the Delta and convey-
ing it to their districts. Purchasers can store water In
State Water Project facilities up to December 1995.
provided that such storage does not interfere with
other project operations. This stored water is also sub-
ject to spillage if the SWP reservoirs fill.
All requests for purchases of water for fish and
wildlife purposes must be channeled through the state
Department of Fish and Game. In 1992. that depart-
ment had the right to purchase 10 percent of the first
200.000 acre feet of water made available for delivery
by the bankat the melded rate. The Department of Fish
and Game also had the right to purchase up to 10 per-
cent of the water made available above 200.000 acre
feet at no cost (delivered at the Delta). The costs of
such water are shared by other entities in the melded
rate.4 8
As Table 2 shows, water purchases were from
three sources: land fallowing (making surface water
supplies available by not planting and irrigating),
groundwater (making surface water available by relying
on local ground water sources or by means of direct
groundwater pumping), and water already in storage
(water reservoirs owned by local districts). In 1991. fal-
lowing agreements covering a total of 166,000 acres
constituted 50 percent of water purchases. Among the
major crops fallowed were corn (59,000 acres), wheat
(44.000 acres), pasture (16.000 acres), alfalfa (10.000
acres), and rice (8.000 acres)z4 Most land fallowing
took place in the Delta region, where a large percent-
age of corn acreage was taken out of production. In
fact. water acquired from fallowing agreements in the
Delta region constituted 41 percent of the total water
acquired by the bank in 1991.53 By comparison, the fal-
lowing of rice acreage was relatively small and consti-
tuted only a small fraction of bank purchases.
Fallowing agreements were based on estimates of
water use by crop. ranging from I acre foot per acre (for
wheat and barley) to 3.5 acre feet per acre (for alfalfa.
pasture, and rice).' 1 At the bank's purchase price for
water, these values resulted in purchases ranging from
$125 per acre to $450 per acre. In 1991. contracts
resulting from use of local ground water accounted for
approximately 260.000 acre feet (32 percent of the
bank purchases), with the majority of these purchases
in the Yuba River and Feather River areas.'2 The bank
monitored land fallowing through aerial reconnais-
sance and field checking, and the fallowing contracts
contained an enforcement provision that any seller
violating such an agreement was subject to paying liq-
uidated damages equal to twice the contract price for
water.5 3
Because of local opposition to exporting ground-
water and concern over possible land subsidence,
groundwater contracts generally required that pumped
groundwater be used on lands overlying its source,
that local water districts release an equal amount of
45. In 1991. once the bank formalized Its rules, buyers had to
deposit 50% of the purchase price within seven days after submitting
their requests and 75% within 15 days.
46. The 1991 bank did not Incorporate monthly pools of water
47. In 1991. the bank provided sellers of water with an "escalator
clause.- guaranteeing that if the bank later raised Its purchase price "for
the same crop in the same area' by more than 10% of the price In a water
sales contract, the seller would receive the higher rate This provision
was included to encourage early participation, rather than having those
interested in selling water to the bank hold out for potentially higher
prices later in the season.
48 The source of this information Is the standard purchaser and
seller contracts
49 caL.A, D-pTc7WATEs Rasauces.supra note 38. at4 Figures
are rounded to nearest one thousanl
50 U at 45
51 Wd at 7 Based on its estimates of water use by craop, the bank
could have altmL-ed the sale of water saved b7 switching to crops that
used less water per aae- Ho-ever. n3 transactlons of this type were
reported by the bank This type of crop switchin would have required
some-hat more polidnr whereas crap fallo-hing could be monitored
easily through aerial phaographs
52 L at 2
53 Interview hith Steve Macaulay. Manager. State Water Bank. in
Sacramento. Cal
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surface water (rather than individual landowners), and
that pumping from wells be metered and logged.54
However, a few contracts, totalling less than 10,000
acre feet, involved pumping of ground water for direct
transfer to the bank.55 Purchases of surface water
stored by local entities accounted for 18 percent of
Table 2







































Source: Steve Macaulay. Manager. State Water Bank, Sacramento.
bank purchases in 1991, mostly in the Yuba and
Feather River areas.56
The water transfers through the bank were gener-
ally from sellers in the northern part of the state to
purchasers south of the Delta. Therefore, transport of
bank water incurred not only evaporation losses, but
also the need to maintain water quality standards In
the Delta as water is pumped from its southern side.
As Table 2 indicates, Delta water quality requirements
accounted for 165,000 acre feet in 1991, leaving
656,000 acre feet for disposition by the bank.
Purchasers bore the costs of carriage losses and Delta
water quality requirements In the
melded price, as well as administra-
tive costs of the bank, The resulting
t Water Bank price to purchasers in 1991 was set at
$175 per acre foot at the Delta ($125
for water purchases, $45 for Delta
transport requirements, and $5 for
administrative costs). The major
water purchaser in 1991 was the
Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California, which account-
40% . ed for 55 percent of the water pur-
7% I chased from the bank.5'7 Purchases
for urban uses were the principal
component (47 percent of total sales
/" ,2.0..- from the bank, see Table 2), but even
at the high purchase price, agricul-
tural users purchased 82,597 acre
feet (13 percent). Water not pur-
chased during 1991 (265,558 acre
feet, or 40 percent) was carried over
as storage in the State Water Project
for 1992.58
Armed with this carryover stor-
age and information on 1992 water
demands and desiring to keep annu-
al purchases and sales in closer bal-
\5 ance, the bank offered only $50 per
acre foot for 1992. This price was set
I to encourage water transfers to the
bank through groundwater substitu-
tion agreements and from storage
• .i_ 1 agreements, but was recognized as
too low to elicit land fallowing agree-
ments. This lower price also avoided
the controversy over community
impacts associated with land fallow-
ing. Table 2 shows the breakdown of
sources for this water (as of
December 30, 1992) and the alloca-
tion of water to Delta water quality
requirements and purchasers. The
sale price of water was set at $72 per acre foot In 1992
($50 for water acquisition costs, $17 for Delta transport
requirements, and $5 for administrative costs), and all
of the water was sold, leaving no carryover storage.
Agricultural uses (95,250 acre feet) accounted for a
somewhat larger absolute amount at this lower price
54. CAUFORNA DErPT OF WATER EsouRcEs, supra note 38. at 8.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2.
57. Purchaser information by district and statistics on the 1992
water banking operations were obtained from Steve Macaulay Manager
of the State Water Bank.
58. Id.
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and, given the lower total sales from the bank. agricul-
tural purchases comprised the largest percentage of
purchases (60 percent), compared with urban uses (25
percent) and wildlife uses (15 percent).59
The Department of Fish and Game did not make
any direct purchases from the bank in 1991. However.
the bank coordinated its operations with the
Department of Fish and Game in order to minimize the
impacts on fish and wildlife6 For example, the bank
maintained water in Shasta Reservoir for temperature
control for the 1991 fall and winter salmon runs The
Department also facilitated other proposals to provide
water to Central Valley wildlife refuges. Under one
such arrangement (which occurred outside the formal
bank transactions), 28.000 acre feet of water was sup-
plied by the Yuba County Water Agency from New
Bullards Bar Reservoir at a reduced cost of S50 per acre
foot for use at the Graylodge. Los Banos, Volta. and
Mendota wildlife management areas.61
Although not all parties were supportive of the
water bank, nearly all participants considered it a suc-
cess, and a number of them singled out the bank's
managers for high praise.62 It was organized quickly
and rapidly acquired over 800.000 acre feet of water in
1991. despite drought conditions. The purchase price
of $125 per acre foot was clearly an attractive induce-
ment to potential sellers. In round numbers the bank
spent some $ 100 million on purchases of water in 1991
and received $68 million in revenues from sellers (the
difference being accounted for by the unsold water car-
ried over in storage for the State Water Project).63 The
bank's tasks were far from simple, consisting not only
of executing 351 contracts for acquiring water in 1991.
but also assuring that the acquisitions did not injure
other water rights, protecting fish and wildlife
resources, and arranging the timing of deliveries to
purchasers of bank water. In short, the urgency of the
water supply situation in 1991 led to a concerted effort
to support a state-operated bank, an effort facilitated
by the governor, administrative agencies of state gov-
ernment, the state legislature, and water users them-
selves.
The following were the principal groups express-
ing concern about water banking. Representatives of
agricultural communities worried about the potential
for adverse impacts on the local economies (particu-
larly from land fallowing) and the impacts of ground-
water pumping on local water levels and on land sub-
sidence. Representatives of environmental organiza-
tions and agencies involved with fish and wildlife were
concerned that fish and wildlife habitats be protected
when water was transferred t4 To some extent, these
concerns were directed more at the concept of water
marketing and prolonged long term transactions than
at the operation of the 1991 drought water bank.
A. Use of Private Brokers
One question that arises is whether the same ser-
vices provided by the state-organized bank could have
been provided by private brokers acting independently
of the state- One view holds that the state bank was
necessary because large-scale water banking was a
concept new to California and because individually
brokered transactions would have been unable to pro-
duce the same number of contracts and quantities of
water in as short a time period-6 The state-operated
bank was able to facilitate the reviews required under
state law-i- e, Fish and Game review to determine
whether the transfers would adversely affect fish and
wildlife (and, where changes in place of use and pur-
pose of use were required, review by the State Water
Resources Control Boardi In addition, the state-oper-
ated bank was able to perform the analyses necessary
to coordinate changes in state and federal project
operations to schedule deliveries from the bank with-
out affecting the states regular commitments to its
contractors & These review opportunities coupled with
the state's control over the bank provided the oppor-
tunity for some innovations on the part of bank opera-
tors For example as originally proposed, most of the
bank's transfers would have increased pumping from
the Delta in the months from July through October. but
analysis showed that July and August were months in
which such pumping would be most harmful to
American shad, Delta smelt, and striped bass To avoid
this problem the state was able to meet its bank com-
mitments by releasing water from the San Luis
Reservoir (south of the Deltaj and then to replace it
later in the summer and fall with water purchased by
the bank0 7 Bank managers also found an innovative
way of utilizing riparian water rights Unlike appro-
priative rights, ripanan water rights are normally not
transferrable and are tied to particular parcels of land
bordering a watercourse The bank made payments to
riparian rights holders under fallowing contracts,
thereby leaving this water in the stream This water
was then used to maintain flows in the Delta for water
quality purposes. thereby freeing up other water
59. Id
60. CAuFoRNtA DEPT OF WATER EsouRcEs. supra note 38. at I0-12
61. Id. at 12. RiCAD HO;,T" Er AL. A RETROSPECTrE c. CPo.mee s
1991 EM.ERGENcY DROUGHT WATER BANr 13 (1992). John B Loomis. Th.e 1991
State of California Water Bank: Water Marketing Takes a Ouanturi Ltap. Rr.TERS
129-34 (1992).
62- See How=r ET AL. supra note 61. at 21-37. lAY R LU'ND ET A..
RECENT CAUFORNIA WATER TRANSFERS EMERGING OPTIONS 1-, WATER
MANAGE%.ENT 57 (1992)
63 The m~rne sp rit can te ob:atc_d by multiplyi g the total
%ater putchased b, the purchae prne of S125 per are-foot The total
sales can be obtained by multip, im? rA- 1337.373 plus 82,5581 trinrs
SI75 (the carro.er of 265.558 a:r'-fLe1 to the VP .as not a sale)
These numegs can be four in table 2
64 Sz. L .%Er #. i.i'jnote2Q at5 5!
65 Ws=L rETAL 140r::: at 32 37 ani 3? 1 J92)
67 UJ
?&kel Tivj Ers d Wear b ffiforrfa
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stored in SWP and CVP facilities for transfer to bank
purchasers.68 The fact that the bank established a uni-
form price for acquiring water, along with an escalator
clause in 1991, may have also facilitated rapid pur-
chases, because potential sellers had no incentive to
wait for a higher price. There had been some discus-
sions among growers of holding out and selling water
at $300 per acre foot,69 but once the bank established
its pricing rules, farmers were induced to participate.
Information on privately brokered transactions
during the drought is not readily available, but there
were some instances where private brokers initiated
transactions, but eventually found it easier to execute
their agreements through the bank.70 It is impossible
to know, of course, whether exclusive reliance on pri-
vate brokerage arrangements would have yielded sim-
ilar results. At a minimum, to have been as rapid, pri-
vate brokerage would have required a well-structured
state process to facilitate the required reviews and
approvals under state law.
However, there is little question that if a well-
functioning review process had been in place and if
California had a history of utilizing market transactions
to reallocate water, then privately brokered arrange-
ments could have substituted for many of the bank's
activities during 1991. Furthermore, market transac-
tions could have served to ameliorate the impacts of
the drought prior to 1991, as did the sales of water
from the Yuba County Water Agency in those years.7'
Also, as discussed in the next section, privately bro-
kered agreements would have been more likely to
bring the quantities of water purchased and sold by
the bank into balance.
If the bank is to operate in the future, the bank
should consider encouraging private brokerage
arrangements, particularly as experience with water
transfers increases and when the bank is operating on
less of an emergency status. The state could also con-
sider using brokers to assist directly in its operation. In
any case, long term water transfers in California will
almost certainly be privately negotiated. Such transac-
tions are likely to be more diverse than the transac-
tions facilitated by the bank (they may differ in dura-
tion, price, and other conditions), and the state has
shown no inclination to organize them through a
state-sponsored water bank.
B. Setting the Bank's Purchase Price
Even before the bank was established in 1991, the
State Department of Water Resources had been nego-
tiating purchases of water for the State Water Project.
When the bank was formed, it took requests from its
68. Howrr ET AL., supra note 61, at 15-17, 41: LUND ET AL., supra note
62. at 54-55.
69. See CAUmENIA DEPT OF WvATER RESOURCES. supra note 38. at 5.
70. See HowrrT ET AL., supra note 61. at 32. 37. 39 (1992).
71. During the first four years of drought, the Yuba County Water
members for their "critical water needs." Because of
the large amounts requested, the bank believed that It
could sell virtually all of the water it acquired. Guided
by their past experience, bank managers believed that
while purchases of storage and ground water substitu-
tion would be relatively inexpensive, the bank could
not obtain the large quantities of water the bank need-
ed without the use of fallowing agreements. Some
quick analyses using farm budgets indicated that
prices ranging up to $115 per acre foot might be nec-
essary for farmers to forgo production and to cover
their various fixed payments for land and equipment.
Wanting to add some additional inducement and to
err on the side of acquiring too much water, rather
than too little, the bank established its purchase price
of $125 per acre foot in 1991, with an escalation clause.
At this price, the bank rapidly began acquiring
large quantities of water. Simultaneously, however,
the bank was in the process of securing written agree-
ments from its members as to the amount of water
they would purchase. Owing in part to heavy March
rains, these amounts were totalling up to be signifi-
cantly less than the need predicted from the original
survey of members. Between mid-February and mid-
April, the estimates of the critical needs of bank mem-
bers fell from a level of more than 800,000 acre feet to
approximately 400,000 acre feet.72 At any rate, the bank
quickly dispensed with the notion of further escalating
the price and slowed its purchases. As noted above,
the bank was left with 266,000 acre feet of carryover
storage in 1991. Under the contractual arrangements
entered into by purchasers, the costs of this carryover
storage (about $33 million at the bank's purchase
price) became an obligation of the State Water Project.
This cost became one component of the capital costs
of the project, and, as such, is distributed among all
water districts that have SWP contracts and receive
water from it. Dissatisfaction with this outcome was
one factor that led the bank to reduce its purchases In
1992.73
Being able to arrive at a "market clearing price," at
which the quantity supplied of a good or service
matches the quantity demanded, usually depends
upon either trial and subsequent adjustment in the
prices of actual market transactions, or considerable
experience with or information about the amounts
offered and sold at different prices. Since marketing
water in these quantities and within this short period
of time was new to California, this information was not
available. However, there are alternative methods of
operation which could be used in future banking oper-
ations to develop this information and -lore closely
match purchase and sale quantities. The oversupply
Agency sold about 290,000 acre-feet of water to other water users (exclu-
sive of Delta carriage water requirements). LUND Er AL,, supra note 62, at
73.
72. Id. at 48.
73. Id. at 62-63.
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problem could be eliminated simply by requiring bank
purchasers to obligate themselves to pay for the
amount of water requested at the price set by the bank
and to stop acquisitions when the amount of water
acquired sums to the requested amount. This is essen-
tially what the bank did in its second year of operation.
Of course, there is no guarantee that this procedure.
by itself, will yield a market-clearing price. On the one
hand, the bank may not be able to acquire the quanti-
ty of water requested at the bank's price. One proce-
dure the bank could use in this situation is simply to
ration the water acquired based on requests.74
Alternatively, the bank could offer higher prices. On
the other hand, too much water might be offered in
response to the initial price set by the bank (the con-
dition that existed in 1991). In this situation the bank
could simply stop making purchases when the amount
of water acquired equalled the sum of the requests.
However, in this situation, the bank purchasers will
have then paid too high a price for the quantity of
water desired. In other words, neither of these modifi-
cations in the bank's operations are likely to yield a
market-clearing price, except by chance.
As an alternative method, the bank could solicit
offers to sell water, as well as offers to acquire water.
in which each offer would specify the quantity, price,
and the month for delivery. A given purchaser (or sell-
er) could be allowed to submit more than one request
for a given month, for example, to purchase 20.000
acre feet of water from the bank if the price were $50
per acre foot and 10,000 acre feet of water if the price
were $75 per acre foot.75 Those operating the bank
would rank the offers to sell and offers to buy by price
and then determine the -equilibrium price' at which
the quantities requested and for sale were in bal-
ance.76 Offers to sell water at or below this price would
be accepted, as well as offers to purchase water at or
above this price. The bank transactions could then be
executed at the equilibrium price.7" At the equilibrium
price, some sellers of water would be rewarded with a
price above their asking price and certain purchasers
of bank water would be rewarded with prices below
their offer price.
Another alternative would be for state officials to
rely on privately brokered transactions to accomplish
74. Such a procedure has been used in the exchange pool operat-
ing within the Arvin-Edison Water Storage District See Wa. supra note
2. at 138-40.
75. For the purpose of ranking, the offers could be segmented into
incremental amounts: in this example, one offer to buy 10.000 acre-feet
at $75 per acre-foot and a second to buy an additional 10.000 acre-feet
if the price were $50 per acre-fooL
76. The bank could add a charge for carriage water and adminis-
trative costs to offers to sell water in determining the equilibrium
77. The submitted prices could also be used. in which case the
bank would make a profit
78. There was a strong sense among the participants In the state
water bank that sellers of water would feel it unfair to be paid different
prices. But there is some evidence that water users would accept trans.
many of the functions of the drought water bank. The
operation of the market would work to bring the water
offered for sale and the water purchased into balance.
Brokers could operate in one of two ways. either (I)
they would not consummate a purchase of water until
they had located a buyer (i.e._ they would first secure
options to buy water), or (2) they would purchase
quantities of water outright for subsequent resale. In
the latter case. the quantities purchased by brokers
would be in relatively small blocks, and brokers would
respond quickly If they discovered that the prices they
were paying were too high to facilitate quick resale.
Unlike the operation of the state water bank, privately
brokered transactions would be executed at a range of
different prices during any given month. 3 These prices
might also vary over time, as the perception of the
severity of the drought or other market conditions
changed. Market operations could involve prices not
only for water to be offered for sale in the current
month, but also prices for water to be offered a few
months hence- In other words, the market for water
supplies could be similar to a "futures market for
grain or other commodities. The existence of a futures
market could help to resolve uncertainty over prices
and availability of supplies later in the growing season.
C. Regulations for Purchasers
The operation of the bank had another feature not
synonymous with 'free market' operations. Municipal
and industrial customers had to meet what were called
.critical needs- requirements; that municipal and
industrial contractors had at their disposal in 1991
only 75 percent of the water available during a normal
water year (80 percent in 1992).7 This requirement was
easily satisfied in 1991 when water supplies were low,
but not in 1992 This requirement was certainly eco-
nomically Inefficient at the wholesale level in that pur-
chasers of water would want to balance the bank price
against the value of water within their jurisdictions,
rather than the value imposed by a 75 percent
rationing standard. In other words, in 1992 users with-
in a service area may have been deprived of uses of
water for which they would have paid at least the
bank's price
The bank adopted some other policies which were
actions conummnated at different prices-namely, the operation of the
federally sponsored drought water bank In Califomia in 1977 under the
authority of Public Law 96-18 Unlike the current state water bank. the
bank did not fix a single price The prices paid by the bank for water
ranged from SI5 per acre-fa, to $85 per acre-foot These prices includ-
ed some profit Incentrwe to sellers, but prices were restricted under the
federal legislation that authwing this bank to prmnent undue profit- to
sellers The prices paid by purchasers of bank zater ranged from 54 93
to S142 44, but part of this range Ls accounted for by the fact that the
prlices included differential con;'eyance and pumping costs See V,,,.
surra note 2. at 136-38 Figures ae from d table 5-3. at 139
79 For exampfe. exhibit Aof the water purchaser contract for 1991.
entitled Pnr.ra; ft Aix al-ps cJ Waler t:r Chnra! t uds. contained the
requirement that total water supplies of purchasers be-less than 75 per
cent of normal water demand In 1991 at the retail leveL"
Spring 1994
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not consistent with economic efficiency. One rationale
for setting the price lower in 1992 was to keep partici-
pation in the bank less expensive and therefore more
viable for potential agricultural purchasers. The agri-
cultural purchases were in fact somewhat larger in
absolute numbers during 1992 (95,000 acre feet, com-
pared with 83,000 acre feet). However, it was also real-
ized that the lower price would result in acquiring
smaller quantities of water. Although the bank operat-
ed by consensus, it was the view of the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California early in 1992 that
this policy would exclude some of its demand for
water. Put in other terms, the price set by the bank was
below the market-clearing price. Repeated operation
of the bank in such a manner would certainly encour-
age some purchasers to arrange for purchases of water
outside the bank, namely those, such as the MWD,
with higher-priced demands that were too large to be
accommodated at the lower bank price.
V. Long-Term Water Transfers and
Other Transactions Outside the Water Bank
The short-term trades undertaken by the drought
water bank have not been the only recent water trans-
fer activity in California. Although this paper makes no
attempt to provide an exhaustive list,80 the arrange-
ments in the southern part of the state, largely initiat-
ed by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California, are illustrative of the variety of forms such
transactions can assume. In addition to the transac-
tion with the Imperial Irrigation District, Metropolitan
has negotiated a groundwater storage agreement with
the Arvin-Edison Water Storage District in the Central
Valley, is currently working out a similar, short-term
arrangement with the Semitropic Water Storage
District in Kern County, and is implementing a test
land fallowing program with the Palo Verde Irrigation
District along the Colorado River.
The agreement with Arvin-Edison is a dry-year
option agreement that involves the conjunctive use of
surface and groundwater. Metropolitan paid for the
construction of spreading basins and pumps in the
Arvin-Edison Water Storage District so that up to
115,000 acre feet of the water to which MWD is entitled
from the SWP can be stored as groundwater under dis-
trict lands. During dry years, MWD will pay the district
to pump and use this water within the district in
exchange for up to 128,000 acre feet of Arvin-Edison's
CVP water.8' The estimated cost to MWD of this water
will be about $90 to $100 per acre foot.
In the agreement negotiated with the Semitropic
Water Storage District, during 1993 Metropolitan
would store up to 100,000 acre feet of its SWP water In
groundwater basins underlying the district. Semitropic
would be responsible for storing and for pumping back
the water, but Metropolitan would pay the district $80
per acre foot for storing the water and $70 per acre foot
for retrieving it, for a total of $150 per acre foot.
The test land-fallowing program with the Palo
Verde Irrigation District is a two-year program that
commenced in 1992. Under this agreement,
Metropolitan pays farmers in the program $620 per
acre per year not to grow crops. At the estimated water
savings of 4.6 acre feet per acre, Metropolitan will
receive about 93,000 acre feet per year from approxi-
mately 20,000 acres enrolled in the program. Including
administrative costs paid to the district and other
Metropolitan expenses, the water will cost over $135
per acre foot.
All of these agreements are expected to provide
water to Metropolitan at prices below the costs of
additions to the State Water Project and below the cur-
rent cost of water from the SWP. The costs of supplies
from adding the Los Vaqueros or the Los Banos
Grandes facilities to the SWP are estimated to exceed
$300 per acre foot per year,82 and the current cost of
SWP water to MWD is about $200 per acre foot. By
comparison, the acquisition of long term supplies
from Imperial will cost Metropolitan about $115 per
acre foot per year,83 and the acquisitions in the three
agreements outlined above are expected to be less
than $150 per acre foot.8
VI. Prior Federal Law and Policies Regarding
Transfer of Federally Supplied Water In California
A. Prior Federal Law
In contrast with state law in California, which con-
tains a number of provisions explicitly written to facil-
itate transfers, federal law dealing with water supplied
by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, until very recently,
did not address water transfers directly. However, a
number of provisions in Reclamation law, some of
them quite old, have been used by entities desiring to
transfer water in a number of Western states. 85
The original Reclamation Act of 19028 limited the
water provided by the construction of federal facilities
80. For a more complete description of water transfers in
California, see LUND Er AL, supra note 62 and Gray. supra note I. See alo
Gray et al., supra note 7.
81. 2 LAWRENCE 1. MACDONNELL ET AL. FACILITATING VOLUNTARY
TRANsFERs OF BUREAU OF REC.AMATION SUPPLIED WATER 42 (1991).
82. See Wahl & Davis, supra note 4, at 114.
83. COLBY Er AL.. supra note 4.
84. Those agreements that depend upon water available from the
Delta. such as the agreement with the Arvln-EdIson Water Storage
District, will be Impacted by the recent CVp Improvement Act and by
endangered species requirements that will limit pumping from the
Delta.
85. For additional discussion, see WATER EFFICIENCY WORKING GROUP,
WEsT.RN Go vNoRs AssocLAwroN, WATER EFfiCIENC* OPPORTUNmES FOR
AcnoN (1987): Gray et al., supra note 7. at 918-19; MACDONNELL Er AL,
supra note 81; and WAl. supra note 2.
86. 43 U.S.C. § 391 (1980).
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to irrigation use. However. once the dams were in
place, other types of users sought use of the facilities
for delivery of nonproject water, as well as unused pro-
ject water. The Town Sites Act of 1906 authorized the
delivery of water to towns and cities in the vicinity of
irrigation projects, provided the municipality owned
the water. The Warren Act of 1911 provided authority
to contract out the excess capacity in irrigation facili-
ties, and to permit water owned by other entities to be
delivered to irrigation water users. The Miscellaneous
Purposes Act of 1920 authorized the sale of project
water for purposes other than irrigation, provided that
the Secretary of the Interior first obtained permission
from the existing water user associations in the project
and provided that the delivery of this water was not
"detrimental to the water service for such irrigation
project or to the rights of any prior appropriator.' The
Reclamation Project Act of 1939. which remains the
principal contracting authority of the Bureau. allows
water formerly designated for irrigation to be contract-
ed for municipal and industrial use (or hydropower
use), so long as the irrigation uses are protected.
The Miscellaneous Purposes Act was cited by the
El Paso County Improvement District No. I (an irriga-
tion district in Texas) when it arranged for the transfer
of water by individual members of the district to the
City of El Paso under a 1962 agreement and to the El
Paso County Lower Valley Water District Authority for
urban uses under a 1988 agreement.87 The Casper-
Alcova Irrigation District in Wyoming utilized the
Reclamation Project Act in its 1982 agreement with the
City of Casper to line portions of its canal and lateral
systems intended to provide the city with up to 7.000
acre feet per year of conserved water s
More generally, the Supreme Court held in
California v. United States that state law governs the con-
trol, appropriation, and distribution of project water
unless the application of state law would be inconsis-
tent with an explicit congressional directive.89 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that -the
conspicuous absence lin federal Reclamation lawl of
transfer procedures, taken in conjunction with the
clear general deference to state water law, impels the
conclusion that Congress intended transfers to be sub-
ject to state water law.90
B. Past Federal Policies
In spite of past examples of transfers of Bureau
water inside and outside authorized service areas
under various existing authorities, a number of ques-
tions have plagued those interested in transferring
such water. These include (1) the need for a clearer
definition of the conditions under which water may be
transferred outside of federal project service areas, (2)
whether the federal government would limit any prof-
it from transfers Involving federally subsidized water,
(3) whether the federal government might apply any
beneficial use standards over and above those provid-
ed in state law. and (4) the applicability of acreage lim-
itations to transferred water.9' And even if prior legal
authorities were sufficient to transfer water, there were
no formal legal rulings by the Interior Solicitor on
these matters, nor was there any written federal poli-
cies addressing the transfer of water prior to 1988.
Because of the Increasing Interest in voluntary
water transfers.in the Western states, the Department
of the Interior responded to a call in 1987 by the
Western Governors' Association to formulate a water
transfer policy within existing federal law.92 This policy
was Issued In December 1988, accompanied by more
detailed guidance issued by the Commissioner of
Reclamation In March 1989.Y These directives recog-
nize the legitimacy of financial payments between con-
tractors for the purpose of providing an appropriate
financial incentive for transfers. These guidelines also
outline the circumstances under which increased pay-
ments need to be made to the Bureau of Reclamation.
For example, when water is transferred from irrigation
use to municipal and Industrial use, water moves from
interest-free repayment under Reclamation law to
interest-bearing repayment. In general, the guidelines
refrain from Imposing additional surcharges on water
transfers, beyond those required in Reclamation law
and contracts.
One recent study has addressed, in part, how well
the Bureau of Reclamation is implementing these
directivesY4 Among the principal findings of this report
are the following: (1) that there are a number of trans-
fers that have taken place in a manner more or less
consistent with the* guidelines, (2) that the Bureau
could do more to educate and train its personnel to
deal with water transfers, and (3) that some Bureau of
Reclamation regions appear to be doing a better job of
implementing the policy than others. in particular.
even though more than three years passed between
the adoption of the Department's policy and the time
87. MAcDONNE L ErAL. supra note 81. at 148.
88. David Engels. Augmenting Municipal Water Supplies 'rlvug
Agricultural Water Conservation. in WESERII wATE FxPANDNG USES/FimE
SupPUEs (1986); WAL., supra note 2. at 141-42; MACDONNE.L Er AL. supla
note 81. at 117.
89. 438 U.S. 678 (1978).
90. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co_ 697 F 2d. 858 (9th
Cir. 1983). See also 503 F. Supp. at 884. For a detailed discussion of the
relation between federal and state law regarding water transfers, see
Gray et al.. supra note 7.
91. The Reclamation Reform Act of 1982.43 US.C. § 390. restricts
the amount of land for which any one owner can recelv federally sup-
plied water and the amount of land on which he or she can receive water
at the federally subsidized rate
92 WATEa Ernavicy WoEmnm Gizott. WwEart~ GmmmooS7
Assoctknou. VlAm Emcwsy 0;xz r..mzs rc2 Acnoar (1987),
93 Thes-e two dourments are available from the Department of the
Interior and are reproduced In ?.UDol.u, zE. Er AL. supra note 81. as
Appendices I and II. respectvely
94 MAcDc.u. ErArL. supa note 81
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of the study, the Bureau of Reclamation's Mid-Pacific
Regional Office, the office with jurisdiction over the
Central Valley Project in California, had failed to
implement the Department's policy. More specifically,
the Mid-Pacific's historical water transfer policy dif-
fered from the 1988 principles in two principal
respects: (1) the region allowed transfers of CVP water
for periods of up to one year only, and (2) the region
did not allow districts or farmers to "profit" from water
transfers (districts were allowed to charge no more
than the Bureau's subsidized contract rates for trans-
ferred water). To its credit, however, the region did
adopt a 1991 interim water transfer policy that allowed
districts a profit, although transfers were still restrict-
ed to a one-year term.95 But the Bureau permitted only
some of its contractors to participate in the 1991 state-
operated drought water bank.96 As discussed below,
1992 federal legislation contained directives specific to
the Central Valley Project and overriding these restric-
tive policies.
C. Past Transfers of Federally Supplied
Water in California
Despite prior restrictions, there have been some
transfers of federally supplied water in the Central
Valley of California. Exchanges of water during the
growing season between users in the same service
area at the Bureau's contract water rates have been
common. 97 The Sacramento River Water Contractors
Association established a pooling agreement in 1974
and the Tehama-Colusa Canal Authority began pool-
ing operations in 1981.98 Farmers offer surplus water to
these pools for distribution to other members, but no
exchanges outside of the pools are allowed. There
have also been a small number of long-term transfers
between districts. For example, in 1985, the Lindsay-
Strathmore Irrigation District in the Central Valley
Project of California reduced its contractual entitle-
ment by 2,500 acre feet to allow the City of Lindsay to
contract for this amount (the city previously had no
contract for CVP water).99
VII. The Central Valley Project
Improvement Act of 1992
and Other Federal Law
Directly Addressing Water Transfers
Water transfers were first addressed directly in federal
legislation enacted for drought emergency purposes.
Public Law 95-18, enacted in 1977, authorized the
operation of federal water banks during the then-cur-
rent drought.100 This act found its greatest application
in California, in which a federally operated bank trans-
ferred over 40,000 acre feet from 7 sellers to 27 pur-
chasers for an average price of around $60 per acre
foot.101
Federal legislation was also enacted in March
1992 to cope with the most recent drought. Although It
did not specifically authorize the federal operation of
drought water banks, as did the 1977 legislation,
Public Law 102-250102 did contain a number of mea-
sures designed to clarify federal transfer authority dur-
ing drought, thereby removing some of the uncertain-
ty plaguing transfers of federally supplied water.
Section 102 of Public Law 102-250 specifically autho-
rizes the use of federal facilities for storage and trans-
port of project and nonproject water for use both with-
in and outside an authorized project service area.
Section 102(e) clarifies that nonproject water can be
conveyed for municipal and fish and wildlife purposes,
thereby extending the authority of the Warren Act,
which limited storage and conveyance of nonproject
water to irrigation purposes. Under Section 102(b)(2),
federal acreage limitation requirements were exempt-
ed from application to new lands (such as lands out-
side the federal project) receiving water during a
drought. The authority of Section 102 is limited to
drought periods, and all temporary contracts for the
purposes outlined can be of no more than two-years In
duration.
Section 101 of Public Law 102-250 authorizes the
Bureau to make purchases of water from willing sell-
ers. Sections 101 and 102, applied together, appear to
grant the Bureau of Reclamation authority to operate a
drought water bank, much as it.did in 1977. However,
in deference to the State Water Bank, already operat-
ing in California in 1992, the Bureau decided not to
organize its own bank. Section 101(d) specifically
authorizes the Department of the Interior to partici-
pate in water banks established by a state.10 3
The first piece of federal legislation which specifi-
cally addressed water transfers outside the drought
context is the 1992 Central Valley Project Improvement
95. U.S. BUREAU OFRECLAMATON. 1991 CENTRAL VALLEY PROlECr WATER
TRANSFER GU]DEUNES (1991).
96. HownT ETAL. supra note 61, at 27. See also infra note 103.
97 Gray. supra note I. at 24-26.
98. Id. at 24-28.
99. Interview with Contracting personnel, U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation. In Sacramento. Cal.
100. Pub. L. No. 95-18, 19 Stat. 36 (1977),
101. WAHL, supra note 2. at 136-38
102. Pub. L. No. 102-250, 106 Stat, 53 (1977)
103. However, in 1991, the Bureau prevented Its contractors
receiving project water from participating In the water bank The only
contractors allowed to participate were those that had water rights set-
tlement contracts. These contracts provide water In acknowledgement of
water rights which existed prior to the construction of Bureau facilities,
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Act. 04 The Act contains various measures principally
designed to -protect, restore, and enhance fish.
wildlife, and associated habitats in the Central Valley
and Trinity River basins." 105 The stated purpose of the
bill is -to increase water-related benefits lof the CVPI
through the expanded use of voluntary water transfers
and improved water conservation."0 6 Section 3405(a)
authorizes all individuals and districts who receive
CVP water under contract (including water rights set-
tlement and exchange contracts) to transfer all or a
portion of their water to any other water user or water
agency in California, and for any purpose recognized as
beneficial under state law. Therefore. clear authority
is provided for out-of-project transfers. Section
3405(a)(1)(E) provides that transfers authorized under
the Act shall be regarded as beneficial uses under the
Reclamation Act of 1902. thereby satisfying any uncer-
tainty that might arise under the federal government's
interpretation of the beneficial use requirement.
Section 3405(a)(1)(G) essentially exempts Reclama-
tion districts that transfer water from any additional
requirements imposed by the Reclamation Reform Act
since it declares that transfers will not be considered
as conferring -supplemental or additional benefits.'
Section 3405(a) can be interpreted to authorize trans-
fers by individuals within a district, provided that the
Secretary of the Interior determines that the transfer
"will have no unreasonable impact on the water sup-
ply, operations, or financial conditions of the transfer-
or's contracting district or agency or its water users."107
Transfers involving more than 20 percent of a district's
long-term contract water are subject to district
approval.' 08 Districts have a 90-day period for their
review.109
The Act requires the Secretary of the Interior to
determine that transfers do not "result in a significant
reduction in the quantity or decrease in the quality of
water supplies used for fish and wildlife purposes.'
unless there are offsetting benefits and equivalent fish
and wildlife mitigation. 0 The Act also requires the
Bureau to render its review of proposed transfers with-
in 90 days of receiving written proposals."' If the
Bureau does not render a decision, then the transfer is
deemed approved." 2 If the Bureau disapproves the
transfer, the reasons must be stated and possible
alternatives must be presented that could render the
transfer proposal acceptable. 13
Although it is restricted to the Central Valley
Project in California. in general the CVP Improvement
Act addresses some of the ambiguities in prior federal
law as applied to water transfers and establishes a
sound basis for water transfers. There are, however,
problematic provisions of the Act that will require
some thought on the part of the Bureau to implement
in an efficient manner. First. under section
3405(a)(I)(F) transfers to uses outside of the CVP are
subject to a right of first refusal by entities within the
CVP service area This right must be exercised within
90 days from the date that 'notice' is provided of the
proposed transfer. An entity exercising the right must
meet the same terms and conditions as the original
purchasing part and must 'compensate the transferee
who had first negotiated the agreement.. .for that enti-
ty's total costs associated with the development and
negotiation of the transfer," 14
Depending on the Bureau's implementation, this
provision could invite opportunistic behavior on the
part of those engaged in transfers of water outside of
the Central Valley Project. As the negotiations
between Metropolitan and Imperial indicate, negotia-
tions for long-term transfers can often take years. If
entities involved in out-of-project transfers are
allowed to provide notice at or near the end of their
negotiation process, they may have incurred such high
costs developing the proposal that the compensation
provision would be a significant barrier to exercising
the right of first refusal, However. this might be an
appropriate outcome because it could prove disruptive
to have another purchaser intervene at the end of such
a process. Furthermore, if the entity exercising the
right of first refusal were in a different part of the state,
then many of the factors involved in transferring water
to the new entity could be different. For example.
availability of surplus capacity for conveying the water
to the new entity, transport cost. environmental
impacts. etc- might not be the same. it could, in turn.
take considerable time to evaluate the transfer to the
intervening entity
An alternate approach, one that would be of some
advantage to potential sellers of water, would be for
the Bureau to require notice very early in the negotia-
tion process. For example, notice could be required
within six months of initiating negotiations. Enforce-
ment could be facilitated by regulations requiring enti-
ties to document the date at which they commenced
negotiations. This would encourage other potential
purchases to enter the process early, and to compete
on the basis of price or other factors. Such a procedure
would also allow state and federal agencies to com-
pare proposals from different purchasers on the basis
of potentially adverse impacts, Of course, doing away
with the first-right-of-refusal provision would provide a
104. 'ride Xxxiv. central valley Prolect Improvement Act of 1992.
104. Title XXX[V. Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992.
Pub. L. No 102-575. 106 Stat. 4706 (1992).
105. Id. 3402(a).
106 Id. 3402(d)
107. Id. 4 3405(aj[ IK).
108. Id. § 3405(a)lI)
109 Id § 3405(a1I21(Al
110 1d § 34051alllHLI
11 Id § 34051al121lA)
112 11 § 34051a1[2110D
113 Id § 34051aI121IC
114 Id § 3405(allIilFI
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different form of level playing field because any poten-
tial purchaser could approach any potential seller.
Provisions of the CVP Improvement Act also
appear to be problematic for short-term transfers. As
noted above, California law exempts temporary trans-
fers from compliance with the California
Environmental Quality Act and substitutes review by
the Department of Fish and Game and a determination
that they have no significantly adverse effects on fish
and wildlife. The Bureau of Reclamation should con-
sider implementing similar provisions in its guidelines
and regulations for implementing section 3405. For
short-term transfers, the Bureau could establish a
timetable for review much shorter than 90-days and
could establish an accelerated form of compliance
with the National Environmental Policy Act. There is
some basis for this in section 3405(a)(I)(D). which pro-
vides for consistency with state law. In the particular
case of short-term, out-of-project transfers, the 90-day
period for right of first refusal is also problematic.
Allowing a 90-day time period to elapse before imple-
menting short-term transfers could push many such
decisions back into December of the year preceding
the growing season, at which time the amount of
expected winter precipitation is still not known.
Congress should consider either eliminating the right
of first refusal or providing an exception for, short-term
transfers.
On February 19, 1993, the Bureau of Reclamation
issued interim guidelines for water transfers under the
Act, with the goal of providing guidance before the
1993 growing season." 5 Earlier drafts were circulated
informally by the Bureau to some of the interested par-
ties.'16 The guidelines provide little detail on how the
Bureau would implement the right of first refusal-pro-
visions. The earlier January 14 draft appeared to
severely constrain the transfer of conserved water," 7
but the February 19 draft indicates that transfers
involving conserved water will be considered on a
case-by-case basis. The February 19 draft further indi-
cates that not only will the Bureau annually review
long-term transfers to make sure that they have no
adverse impacts on project operations and environ-
mental conditions, but also that the Bureau will sub-
ject long-term transfers involving more than 20 per-
cent of a district's water to annual review by such dis-
tricts, This provision for annual district review appears
to go beyond the requirements of the CVP
Improvement Act and is likely to severely constrain
long-term transfers.
In conclusion, although the CVP Improvement Act
Volume 1, flumber 1
represents a significant step forward in federal water
transfer law, it contains a few problematic provisions
that will require some thought to implement in a way
that will not discourage some desirable transfers. The
Bureau intends eventually to pursue a formal rule-
making process for its water transfer guidelines, which
would be one opportunity to air alternative approach-
es for implementing some of the more problematic
sections of the legislation, such as the right of first
refusal for out-of-project transfers and the 90-day
notice period. Another alternative is to seek amended
federal legislation.
VIll. Environmental Uses of Water
Although common parlance may not recognize it, the
concept of economic value includes not only com-
modities which are normally marketed in some form,
but also uses which human beings value even though
they do not normally involve markets. In other words,
not only does water have economic value for irrigation,
domestic use, and hydropower production, but also for
recreational boating, fishing, and as a habitat for
wildlife. There are various approaches to maintaining
such resources, ranging from direct regulation and
establishing rights to instream flows, to purchasing
water for such uses. Many of the important events In
the recent history of California water management
reflect struggles between traditional water diversions
and emerging demands for environmental uses, which
usually call for more instream water. These have
involved limiting Los Angeles' diversion of waters
flowing into Mono Lake in order to assure higher lake
levels, defeating the Peripheral Canal which would
have diverted more water from the north side of the
Delta to south of the Delta, and establishing higher
water quality standards for the Delta. The impact of
these events has been sweeping, potentially affecting
a large number of existing water rights and contracts
for project water. Two recent events with potentially
similar consequences are the adoption of the federal
CVP Improvement Act and the State Water Resources
Control Board Draft Decision 1630.118
The CVP Improvement Act contains several mea-
sures for maintaining or restoring fish and wildlife
habitat. For one, the Act mandates an allocation of
water for these purposes, including specific quantities
of water to maintain a number of wildlife refuges, 19 an
instream release of at least 340,000 acre feet of water
per year into the Trinity River,120 and an additional
115. U S BUREAU OF RECLANIATION. DRAnr INTERiM GUIDEUNES FOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WATER TRANSFER P OVISIONS OF THE CENTRAL VALLEY
PROIECT IMPROVENENT AcT (1993).
116. Earlier drafts were dated December 17, 1992. and January 14.
1993.
117. The thrust of that section would have been contrary to that of
California law which contains no such provisions, but rather deems the
transfer of conserved water to be a beneficial use
118. The issues over environmental safecuards continue to receive
federal attention, Conditions very much like those In Draft Decision 1630
will likely have to be imposed by the state board or by the EPA
119- CVP Improvement Act, Pub. L No 102-575, § 3406(d) (1992)
120 ld. § 34061b)f23),
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annual allocation of 800.000 acre feet of water for the
primary purpose of implementing fish, wildlife, and
habitat restoration.' 21 These are sizable quantities of
water: in normal water years the Central Valley Project
delivers about 5 million acre feet of irrigation water
and 500,000 acre feet of municipal and industrial water
(although municipal and industrial deliveries are
expected to rise to twice that level), and the State
Water Project delivers from 1.2 million to 1.5 million
acre feet. In addition, the Act puts forth goals for
establishing higher levels of anadromous fish In
Central Valley rivers.' 22 The Act indudes surcharges on
all CVP contract water for deposit to a Fish and Wildlife
Restoration Fund (described in more detail below), an
increasing block rate (additional surcharges on water
exceeding 80 percent of prior contract entitlements).
and limits on long-term contracts until certain wildlife
and water quality restoration goals are met.
Draft Decision 1630 was intended to improve
existing fish and wildlife protection by specifying flow
standards and water quality standards at various
points in the Delta and the river systems feeding It.'12
It proposed to severely limit the times at which
"reverse flows" in the Delta could exist, because such
flows entrain fish and other biota in the Tracy and
Harvey Banks pumping plants supplying water to the
federal and state projects at the south side of the
Delta. The order also proposed to mandate 'pulse-
river flows at key times of the year designed to assist
migrating fish species. During these periods, appropri-
ators could be constrained from diverting water for
periods of up to two weeks.
Based on hydrologic computer models developed
by the state, the Draft Decision 1630 standards were
expected to reduce exports through the Delta to the
state and federal projects by 800.000 acre feet (to a
level of 5.6 million acre feet) and to increase Delta out-
flow to the ocean by the same amount.124 However, the
Draft Decision indicated that these water supply
impacts would be lessened by the 600,000 to 800,000
acre foot yield of the CVP made available for fish and
wildlife enhancement purposes under the CVP
Improvement Act, although no quantitative analysis
was provided.' 25
On April I, 1993, California Governor Pete Wilson
requested the State Water Resources Control Board to
stop work on Draft Decision 1630 and to shift their
focus to establishing permanent standards designed
to protect the San Francisco Bay and the Sacramento-
San Joaquin Delta. Among the reasons cited by the
Governor for this request were that the reductions in
Delta water exports that would likely be mandated by
federal agencies acting under authority of the
Endangered Species Act to protect the Delta smelt and
the winter run of Chinook salmon would be equally, if
not more. restrictive than those contemplated by Draft
Decision 1630.
Therefore. recent federal actions threaten to
reduce historical water entitlements by significant per-
centages (as would Draft Decision 1630. as proposed).
Uncertainty over the exact amount of the reductions
also creates obstades for water transfers, because it
creates uncertainty concerning what property right is
being purchased. For example, reductions in Delta
exports are expected to have an impact on previously
negotiated transfers that depended upon state or fed-
eral project water transported through the Delta, such
as the groundwater storage agreement (described
above) between MWD and the Arvin-Edison Water
Storage District. If existing water rights are subject to
continual reexamination and reduction by govern-
ment. then they are considerably less valuable as a
marketable commodity. So. even though the state
water code has gone to great lengths to create certain-
ty over the rights to conserved and transferred water,
other federal and state activities have created uncer-
tainties over water entitlements. These conditions are
certainly one reason that water districts have been
cautious about entering into more water transfers.
On the other hand. the CVP Improvement Act and
Draft Decision 1630 (as proposed) create new opportu-
nities for water transfers. For example. Draft Decision
1630 Indicated that some surplus pumping capacity
would be available for transferring non-project water.
Pumping capacity for additional water trans-
fer exports exists and can be used without
violating the standards.... The additional
exports can be divided into two categories:
additional exports when the OWEST (reverse
flow standard) Is not at maximum levels'26
and additional exports when the OWEST
standard is at the limit.27 The latter category
allows approximately 30 percent of water
released from the Sacramento River Basin to
be exported (assuming the Delta Cross
Channel gates are open). The remaining 70
percent must be allowed to flow to the ocean
in order to avoid violating the QWEST restric-
tion. This restriction would not apply to water
transfers from the San Joaquin Basin. While
additional exports by transfers are possible.
121. Id. § 3406(b)(2)
122. Id. Anadromous fish are species that migrate from the oean
upstream to successfully complete their life cycle, such as salmon.
which spawn in freshwater.
123. CmuFoim.A STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD. DRAT WATER
RIGHT DECISION 1630 (1992) This decision, as proposed, was to update
the former Board Decision 1485
124 Id at 85
125 0d at89
126 ShoAn as MO.000 acae-feet per year for the 1984 to 1989 peri-
od.U fig Eat88
127 Shown as 900.000 acre-feet per year for the 1934 to 1989 peri-
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such exports will have variable effects on the
habitat in the central Delta depending on the
source and timing of the water transferred. 128
The exact impact of Draft Decision 1630 on Delta
exports was uncertain, and some modeling efforts
indicated that greater reductions in Delta exports
would be necessary. 29 If the requirements of the CVP
Improvement Act and the Endangered Species Act
impose large reductions, then the carriage water
requirements for transferring additional water through
the Delta may be so high that the Delta will be a barri-
er to water transfers. Therefore, future transfers may
well be divided into two pools: transfers among enti-
ties south of the Delta (which the above citation from
the Draft Decision indicates are not constrained by
water quality considerations) and a smaller number of
transfers among entities north of the Delta.
Because the deliveries from the state and federal
project to districts south of the Delta will be reduced
by federal requirements, some water managers in
California are calling the current situation a new "reg-
ulatory drought." Indeed, in its March 12, 1993, water
supply outlook for the coming year, the Bureau of
Reclamation indicated that even though the runoff
conditions were approaching those of a normal water
year, south of the Delta agricultural contractors were
projected to receive only 40 percent of normal supplies
and urban contractors 75 percent of historic use. By
contrast, north of the Delta, agricultural contractors
were projected to receive 65 percent of normal sup-
plies, urban contractors 90 percent of historic use, and
water rights contractors 100 percent of normal sup-
plies. The Bureau attributed these reduced allocations
to two factors: (1) the cumulative effect of six previous
years of drought, and (2) regulatory requirements
stemming from the CVP Improvement Act and the
Endangered Species Act. Some districts are likely to
attempt to make up for the reduction through water
purchased through transfers. Therefore, a strong
south-of-Delta market in the available project supplies
and other sources may develop. Water agencies
should consider extending the life of the drought water
bank or encouraging privately negotiated transactions
to address these needs. Even if improving precipita-
tion prohibits the bank from operating under the leg-
islated authorities specifically addressed to drought,
there appears to be ample authority in California law
for the bank to continue in a somewhat altered form
(for example, using the authority for temporary trans-
fers and for contracting by districts to implement
them).
The CVP Improvement Act contains other provi-
sions that are likely to create a water market for envi-
ronmental purposes (as did Draft Decision 1630, as
proposed). The CVP Improvement Act places sur-
charges on water users of up to $6 per acre foot (at
October 1992 price levels) for irrigation contractors, up
to $12 per acre foot for municipal and industrial con-
tractors, and up to $25 per acre foot for new purchasers
outside of the CVP (for example, those receiving water
through a water transfer). 30 These surcharges and
additional levies on power users in the project are to
bring annual collections up to $30 million for deposit
in a CVP Restoration Fund.131 An additional $20 mil-
lion is authorized for collection from other revenue
sources outlined in the bill, for a total of $50 million
per year.132 Among the permitted uses of the
Restoration Fund is the acquisition of water from will-
ing sellers.133
Draft Decision 1630, as proposed, contained pro-
visions that paralleled those in the CVP Improvement
Act, including surcharges on State Water Project
Contractors. Under the Draft Decision, users of surface
water who consume water within the area of origin
were to pay a "mitigation fee" of up to $5 per acre foot,
while the fee for exported water could range up to $10
per acre foot (CVP contractors who pay similar fees
under the CVP Improvement Act were exempt from
these state charges, except for water obtained under
their own water rights). 134 These fees were to be
deposited in a Bay/Delta Estuary Fund to pay for loans,
projects, and other activities designed to improve fish
and wildlife habitat in the Bay/Delta estuary. 135
In summary, these federal and state actions Illus-
trate that it is highly important to resolve Delta water
quality issues in order to achieve more certainty over
water rights. In a December 9, 1992, press release,
Governor Wilson flatly stated that "We must recognize
a disturbing truth: the Delta is broken. It is the center-
piece of California's most intractable water problem."
To address this problem, the Governor launched
the Bay Delta Oversight Council and a state Water
Policy Council. The Oversight Council is charged with
developing a solution to the controversies involving
Delta water quality standards within 3 years. Whether
this timetable can be met remains to be seen, given
the large number of actors with different interests that
are affected by water quality standards in the Delta
and the independent regulatory status of the State
Water Resources Control Board. After the Governor
requested the Board to withdraw the Draft Decision
1630, some members of the Council who represented
environmental interests threatened to resign.
Nevertheless, the advances that environmental Inter-
ests have made toward their goals may result in fewer
128. Id. at 87-89 (footnotes added).
129. Interview with Roger Patterson. Regional Director, Bureau of
Reclamation, In Sacramento, California (February 10, 1993).
130. See supra. note 106.
131 Id.w
132. l14 § 34071b), (cl.
133. Id. § 3407(a).
134. CAUFORN* STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, supra note
121,at 116.
135. Id. at 11 5-17
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future confrontations. Moreover. because environmen-
tal purposes are now likely to have substantial funds
(through surcharges) for purchases of water, environ-
mental interests will have some stake in a reasonable
degree of certainty over the water entitlements that are
purchased for fish and wildlife uses.
Reallocation of water, restrictions on long-term
contracts, and the source of funds for purchasing water
represent political judgments as to how the burden of
paying for water for fish and wildlife purposes should
be spread. However, regardless of one's views on this
distributional issue, the idea of allowing public agen-
cies charged with the protection of fish and wildlife
resources to buy water to further their missions, just as
they buy land and construct physical facilities, is an
appealing one. If market transfers are to play an
increasing role in water allocation decisions, then not
only should existing uses for these purposes be pro-
tected in water transfer proceedings, as California law
provides, but these uses should be granted appropria-
tive rights. State programs for such public uses for
water should be supplemented with private appropria-
tions of water for the same purposes, for no public
agency can be expected to know of all of the individual
circumstances in which private individuals or organi-
zations place a high value on instream water use.136
In this regard, California law appears incomplete.
Even though instream uses of water are regarded as
beneficial under California law. there is no appropria-
tive right for such uses, as there is in most other
Western states. 37 In some Western states (such as
Arizona and Alaska), individuals or private organiza-
tions can file for and hold instream rights. In others,
such as Colorado and Oregon. only state agencies can
hold such rights. In Colorado and Oregon, private par-
ties can donate (or arrange for donations) of rights to
the state for instream purposes, and in Colorado, such
donations may be accompanied by an enforceable
contract between the donor and the state concerning
how the water is to be used. The procedure in
California differs from those in other Western states.
The Department of Fish and Game reviews new appro-
priations for water diversions and transfers, and can
recommend that they be denied or that conditions be
attached to them to protect fish and wildlife. The
California system appears to involve more agency
review and less clarity and security than systems where
appropriative rights are granted for such purposes and
where such rights can be legally defended. The evolu-
tion in instream flow law has been gradual in other
Western states and one recent change in California
suggests limited adoption of the appropriation view.
In 1991. provisions were added to the California WVater
Code allowing owners of existing appropriative. ripari-
an. or other rights, to change the purpose of use to
.preserving or enhancing wetlands habitat, fish and
wildlife resources, or recreation in. or on. the water." 33
This appears to open the door to conversion of exist-
ing rights, but does not establish instream uses as full
appropriative rights.
IX. Concern O;er Community Impacts
Another factor that may have inhibited water transfers
in California Is concern over community or third-party
impacts. If there is a large change in agricultural pro-
duction in one area. then businesses and individuals
that supply agricultural producers or that process its
output will also be affected. Although these business-
es may have no legal right to the water involved or no
legal protections against changes in economic condi-
tions. they are legitimately concerned about their
livelihood. If a water transfer involves only the use of
conserved water, then the transfer will have no nega-
tive third-party Impacts since the same amount of land
will be left in production. In fact, there may be some
increase in local employment connected with
installing and maintaining the conservation mea-
sures.139 if the water transfers are short-term in dura-
tion (such as the transfers under the water bank) or are
limited to a small percentage of the acreage in one
area. then they are unlikely to have severe impacts on
third parties even if they Involve reduced crop produc-
tion. However. If the transfers are long-term and sig-
nificant acreages of agricultural land are retired, then
third-party impacts are inevitable. These are simply
the costs that society incurs for moving water to more
economically productive activities. Similar impacts
occur when industries of other types relocate. There
are. of course, offsetting third-party gains in areas that
purchase the water and areas where the proceeds from
the sales are invested.
Some Information on short-term, third-party
impacts was developed for the 1991 operation of the
state water bank In a state-commissioned study.140
Among the counties with large amounts of agricultur-
al production, some experienced a significant percent-
age of land fallowing: 20 percent of the acreage in
Sacramento county. 12 percent in Yolo County. and 10
percent in San Joaquin County.14' The corresponding
estimates for losses in economic activity in these three
counties were S8 million. $3 million, and S20 million
respectively, but the changes represented very small
136. For additional discussion of this point, see ANDERSON. suPA2
note 2. at 73-92. Wahl. supra note 3. and Terry L Anderson & Donald R
Leal. Buy That Fish a Drnk "e Water Markeing Aften .ire to ESA ItPe
Endangered SpecesArMl. EmiRON:METAL PE S nEs. Sept I. 1992
137. INsTREA.m FLOW PROTECTION I  THE WEST (Lawrence I.
MacDonnell et al. eds. 1989). WAHL,. supra note 2
138 CoL WATER CczE § 1707 (We1Supp 1992)
139 For earnp!e. such actit'ues as laser levelling of fields, con-
cete lining of cnals. and installation of facilities to recycle runoff from
fields ould haT;e additional expenditures for labor and equipment
140 Ho.rT ETAL. su,ra r2e61.at 55-58(1992)
141 Id at 18
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percentage changes in overall county employment
(less than 0.5 percent in each case). 142 These estimates
do not include any local gains from reinvestment of
proceeds from water sales in the local community,
such as purchases of new farm equipment or land
improvements, such as laser levelling. The total esti-
mated loss in employment in all counties affected by
the bank was valued at $13 million. 43 On a state-wide
level, these losses were more than offset by the
increase in just the agriculture income in the regions
importing water (estimated at $45 million). 44 Of
course, the major purchasers of water from the 1991
water bank were urban users. The study estimates the
direct benefits to urban areas at $91 million, without
including the additional indirect economic gains. 145
Another study of a hypothetical transfer of up to
500,000 acre feet of water from agricultural to urban
uses, sponsored by the Bay Area Economic Forum and
the Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California,' 46 estimated that if the water were trans-
ferred from the lowest value agricultural uses, only
2,000 jobs related to agriculture would be lost (around
1 percent of total employment in those sectors). The
study noted that this impact was much smaller than
normal fluctuations in agricultural employment relat-
ed to weather and agriculture prices (which ranged up
to six times as large) and much smaller than fluctua-
tions that have resulted from land fallowing associat-
ed with federal price support programs. Estimates
were that the loss in agricultural employment would
be 2 jobs and $250,000 of revenue per every thousand
acre feet of water transferred. According to the esti-
mates in the study, in the state's manufacturing sector,
the same amount of water would be associated with
some 2,600 jobs and $387 million of revenues. 47 The
report also noted that there are several mitigation
measures that could be put in place to compensate
areas from which water is transferred, such as pay-
ments for job training and direct compensation. The
report estimates that the economic gains from a trans-
fer would be more than sufficient to fund them
(through a tax on transfers or through other means).
X. Conclusions
Market transfers of water have definitely taken a place
in California's water future. Major transfer agreements
have become common in southern California, largely
initiated by the Metropolitan Water District. Although
transfers of federal and state project water in
California's Central Valley have been limited, the 1991
and 1992 drought water banks have broken new
142. Id. table 4, following p 20.
143, Id. at 19.
144. Id,
145. Id. at 20.
ground in a dramatic way, with over 800,000 acre feet
of purchases in 1991 and nearly 200,000 acre feet in
1992. Even though the state is not experiencing
drought conditions for 1993, water agencies are going
to experience reductions in water availability because
of environmental restrictions imposed by federal legis-
lation and endangered species requirements (if not
also by the State Water Resources Control Board)-
what some have termed a new "regulatory drought." As
a result, California water agencies should consider
continuing the ivater bank in some form and/or allow-
ing privately negotiated transactions to serve the same
function.
If the state does continue its water banking oper-
ations, the state should consider restructuring the
financial transactions in a way that will assure that
purchases and sales are balanced at a market-deter-
mined price by either using something akin to a bid-
ding process or allowing privately negotiated transac-
tions. Consideration also ought to be given to chang-
ing other bank rules that were inconsistent with effi-
cient markets, such as the requirement in 1992 that
participants had to have less than 80 percent of nor-
mal supplies.
The experience gained from operation of the bank,
coupled with the water transfer provisions of the CVP
Improvement Act, should provide an opening for more
short-term and long-term water transfers, Privately
negotiated transactions (including ones facilitated by
water brokers) should certainly play a role in the latter,
if not in the former as well. Certain of the provisions in
the CVP Improvement Act, such as the right of first
refusal, are likely to present difficulties for successful
operation of market transactions unless the Bureau of
Reclamation implements them carefully or seeks their
repeal. State water law on transfers, including protec-
tions for conserving and for transferring water and the
streamlined process for approving temporary trans-
fers, provides a useful guide. In fact, the federal legis-
lation calls for consistency with state water law.
Recreational and other environmental uses of
water represent an important component of economic
value. Recent state and federal actions contemplate
the establishment of funds by which state and federal
government bodies can make market purchases of
water for fish and wildlife purposes. However, these
same actions have also resulted In a current state of
great uncertainty regarding supplies that will be avail-
able to project contractors. This uncertainty cuts both
ways. It is likely to encourage short-term market pur-
chases of water by those seeking to firm up their sup-
plies. However, it also creates uncertainty over current
property interests in water and what quantities of
146. DAVID L. MrTCHELL, WATER MARKETING IN CALIFORNIA: RESOLVING
THIRD-PARTY IMPACT IssuEs (1993),
147. If the policies of urban entitles are to curtail household water
uses during drought while protecting industrial uses, then the transfer of
water to urban areas during a drought may do more to relieve reductions
in domestic uses than to enhance industrial uses
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waterwater will attach to the rights being purchased, there-
by casting a shadow over long-term transfers. This 2
uncertainty is likely to continue for some time as reg-
ulatory decisions are challenged and rewritten, and
until the results of modeling the impacts of those deci-
sions are clarified. The state is correct to place empha-
sis on resolving these critical issues. Because the pur-
chase of water for fish and wildlife restoration is sub-
stantially funded, environmental interests will also
have a stake in the certainty of the rights they plan to
purchase, as well as security over the rights once they
are acquired. In this regard, the state might also bene-
fit from adding full appropriative rights for instream
and fish and wildlife purposes to its water code, as
other Western states have done.

